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Europe needs fair and transparent debt work-out mechanisms: lessons from the Icelandic case

17 June 2010

Sovereign debt and balance of payments crises were long thought to be the bane of developing countries, but not an issue for advanced economies. The economic and financial crisis has shattered that belief. Even before the current spate of fiscal crises among euro area countries, Iceland faced a debt crisis following the implosion of its banking system.

 

This European Trade Union Institute Policy Brief written by Eurodad and members considers the lessons to be drawn from Iceland's experience. The policy brief highlights how the Icesave case has brought to the forefront of public debate in Europe key questions that anti-poverty activists have been raising for more than a decade. For instance,

  • Who should be responsible for sovereign debts and how can they be held accountable? Is it only the borrower? Or does the creditor bear some sort of responsibility?

 

  • How should a country’s financial situation affect the terms of repayment of a debt? Should the lender’s claims take priority over the borrower’s chances to rebuild their economy? What power should the holding of debt assign to creditor over debtor?

 

  • Who should decide on disputed debt claims and terms of repayment? Is there a fair, independent and transparent institutional mechanism which all parties involved regard as legitimate enough to be able to arbitrate?  

 

This policy brief outlines the course of events in Iceland since the end of 2008, and makes specific recommendations for resolving the issue, drawing implications also for sovereign debt more generally.  


Using the Civil Society Principles on a  Sovereign Debt Work-Out Procedure  it outlines some policy implications for Iceland’s overall debt problem, including the Icesave case. Six principles are salient: 

 

  1. Creation of a decision-making body which is independent of creditors.  The sovereign debt work-out procedure must be independent of any creditor institution or body. This is clearly not currently the case for Iceland. Instead the Netherlands and the UK use their power in both the IMF and the EU to put pressure on Iceland. In principle, all creditors, including the Dutch and British claimants, should submit their claims to an independent institution or body.
  2. A comprehensive process.  While the present Dutch/British initiatives are the expression of individual creditors’ efforts to secure repayment of specific debts, the restoration of Iceland’s economic viability needs a comprehensive approach, unimpaired by piecemeal and individual creditor interests.
  3. Legitimacy.  Beyond issues of debt sustainability, an independent arbitration panel needs to verify  the validity of each individual claim, which is clearly not (yet) proven in the Icesave dispute.
  4. Assessment of the indebted country’s economic situation by a neutral body.  As in a (US) Chapter 9 proceeding, the essential functions of the Icelandic state need to be secured when its payment capacities towards its external creditors are considered. Assessment to this end must necessarily be carried out by an independent body.
  5. Public participation.  The referendum is an impressive act of taking the issue of a country’s fiscal and external viability out of the negotiation rooms of treasuries, central banks and private lenders, and submitting some of the key decisions on debt repayment to public consultation in a more transparent and participatory way. The Icelandic government would be extremely well advised to continue to subject any proposed agreement with external creditors to public scrutiny. 
  6. Enforceability.  All parties must respect the decision of the independent arbitrators.

 

 

Not  only would a structured and independent mechanism be more effective than today’s time-consuming and costly restructuring procedures, but a mechanism that works according to the Ten Civil Society principles would increase predictability for both lenders and borrowers and could transform international financing, by ensuring that debt is both responsible and payable. It would transform relations between lender and borrower, creating a basis on which debts could be seen as truly a matter of joint responsibility.


Download the full policy brief here:

 

Informes.

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