No, establishing the debt convention would address the shortcomings of the current system. As an informal body, the G20 lacks inclusivity and the formal authority to pass binding agreements, despite its influence in shaping outcomes. The IMF, while crucial as a lender of last resort, does not have any formal mediation or facilitation role in sovereign debt restructurings, although it plays this role informally. Additionally, as a creditor itself, the IMF has been criticised for its democratic deficit and perceived bias toward creditor interests. The IMF’s lack of independence undermines its credibility and raises questions regarding the fairness of its decisions. In 2023, the IMF, World Bank, and G20 created the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR), to advance towards agreements and principles for debt restructuring. However, the GSDR is still dominated by creditors, it is not fully inclusive to all borrowing countries, and it remains an informal space.

Furthermore, none of these institutions have jurisdiction for norms setting, unlike the UN. Under its founding charter, the UN has a broad and intergenerational mandate: “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. The G20, the IMF, and the GSDR have historically prioritised voluntary approaches, which have proven inadequate. Making the debt architecture reform work for the people and the planet necessarily means going from an inefficient non-regime of voluntary principles to a statutory framework based on agreed rules and norms. The UN has a foundational mandate to undertake this.

Rather than duplication, an intergovernmental process at the UN towards a debt convention would ensure universal representation in discussions and decision making, including all borrowing countries from the global south. The debt convention would also facilitate coordination among well-established negotiation groups like the G77, AOSIS, and the African Group. Such a process would also allow for progressive governments in creditor countries to support the reform of the debt architecture towards a fair, inclusive, and transparent system, instead of having to follow the positions mandated by the G7 or the Paris Club.