The failed Billions to Trillions experiment: What comes next?

This report exposes how, rather than unlocking trillions of dollars, the World Bank's Billions to Trillions agenda has facilitated public-to-private wealth transfers, constrained countries’ policy space, inflated sovereign debt, exacerbated systemic inequalities, and harmed communities in the Global South. Launched ahead of the WB/IMF Annual Meetings and COP31, this report has been endorsed by eight organisations: ActionAid, Bond, Bretton Woods Project, Christian Aid, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), LATINDADD and Society for International Development  

More than a decade after the launch of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) ‘Billions to Trillions’ (B2T) agenda – introduced ahead of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD3) in Addis Ababa in 2015 – evidence suggests that it has fallen short of its promise to mobilise development and climate finance at the scale or quality that is so urgently needed.

By repositioning public development finance and Official Development Assistance (ODA) as tools to de-risk private investment, the agenda has prioritised private profitability over positive development outcomes and climate action. Rather than unlocking trillions of dollars, this approach has facilitated public-to-private wealth transfers, constrained countries’ policy space, inflated sovereign debt, exacerbated systemic inequalities, and harmed communities in the Global South. In late 2024, then World Bank Chief Economist Indermit Gill acknowledged that the agenda’s foundational premise had proved to be a ‘fantasy’.

The evidence presented in this briefing points to the urgent need for alternative approaches, with less than five years remaining until the 2030 deadline and only 36 per cent of the SDGs on target. This is underscored by an acute development crisis: more than 3.4 billion people are living in countries that spend more on servicing debt than on health and education, while the impacts of climate change continue to escalate.

On the positive side, the Global South is leading the way in setting out a new agenda, including through the African Union’s Accra Next Steps Commitments on Reparatory Justice. The multilateral effort to set out a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels is also encouraging. Embracing these progressive developments, this briefing sets out a forward-looking agenda for moving beyond market-led de-risking towards a Global South-led, rights-based approach to development finance architecture that puts public finance, Global South sovereignty, and reparative justice at its centre.

The trillion-dollar shortfall

Official data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Multilateral Development Bank (MDBs) exposes the stark gap between the B2T’s ambitions and its results.

Between 2022 and 2023, external private creditors extracted $141 billion more in debt service from developing nations than they provided in new financing. And, over the period 2022-2024, cumulative net debt service outflows from developing nations to their external creditors reached $741 billion.

Private capital tends to flow where returns are highest and perceived risks are lowest, creating a bias against low-income countries as well as social and productive sectors. From 2015-24 the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) received just 9.6 per cent of total mobilised private funds compared with 40.6 per cent for upper middle-income countries (UMICs). Investment was equally skewed across sectors, with social infrastructure – where private investments are particularly unsuitable (health, education, clean water) – receiving a mere 5.7 per cent, while productive sectors like agriculture – which employs nearly 50 per cent of the labour force in LDCs – received negligible investment. Climate adaptation – a critical priority for climate-vulnerable countries – received just 8 per cent.

The quality problem: High costs and limited impact

At the same time, there is significant evidence of the harm this approach has done to sustainable development and human rights in Global South countries. Instead of driving more money into the Global South, global financial markets have facilitated massive financial outflows. Between 2022 and 2024, external private creditors extracted $141 billion more in debt service from developing nations than they provided in new financing, driving total net debt service outflows to $741 billion over the same period.

While Global North governments have embraced state-led industrial policy and direct public infrastructure investment at home, they continue to promote market-led, private-first approaches abroad. This double standard is compounded by a historic 23.1 per cent collapse in bilateral ODA in 2025, alongside a 13.1 per cent surge in aid diverted into Private Sector Instruments (PSIs) amounting to $4.5 billion.  

Relying on private capital to close development and climate financing gaps is economically inefficient and politically risky. High mobilisation ratios incentivise Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) to back low-risk, commercially viable projects in wealthier markets that would likely proceed without public support, sacrificing additionality.

Following the adoption of the Compromiso de Sevilla at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025 (FfD4) – and in line with above-mentioned Global South-led initiatives – international development and climate finance must now shift away from market de-risking towards a Global South-led, rights-based development architecture, grounded in the Right to Development.

Delivering this vision requires action across three policy pillars: first, reasserting state capacity in the public interest; second, strengthening public capital and public purpose led-institutions; third, rebuilding the macro-financial architecture to support this.

This briefing also puts forward three recommendations for MDBs and Global North governments to help advance this agenda:

1. Make public finance the core of development and climate finance, particularly for social infrastructure, public services, and climate resilience. This means rebalancing the role of public and private finance in sustainable development.

2. Ensure that, when deployed, de-risking mechanisms do not deepen sovereign debt, shrink fiscal and policy space, or result in harm to communities in Global South countries.

3. Support policy sovereignty and reparative justice for Global South countries.

The ultimate lesson of the past decade is that a blind faith in private finance as a catch-all solution to fund the SDGs and climate action was a flawed experiment. As compounding debt, climate, and development crises deepen, Global North governments and MDBs must abandon persistent double standards and align their global policies with rights-based, democratic, and sovereign development.