17 September 2026 

Dear EIB Group Directors, 

As civil society organisations with experience working with communities impacted by the EIB Group’s 
investments, as well as evaluating the policies and practices of the independent accountability 
mechanisms that have produced improved outcomes for communities affected by internationally financed 
projects, we welcome the latest draft of the new EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Policy. We wish to 
commend the informed and meaningful public consultation process organised by the EIB Group 
Complaints Mechanism during which the views of the Mechanism’s intended users, civil society 
organisations and other contributors have been extensively taken into account.  

Preliminarily, we welcome a more integrated and clarified Policy, and we support that its entering into 
force will not be contingent on the development and adoption of Procedures. Nevertheless, if Procedures 
are to be developed in the future, we urge the EIB Group to follow best practice and present a draft for 
public consultation in the interest of public accountability and trust-building. 
After having engaged with the EIB-CM’s consultative efforts, we write to express appreciation for the 
ways that the latest draft improves upon the previous iteration, taking into consideration many of the 
comments and recommendations from the contributors. At the same time, and as explained in more detail 
below, some critical gaps remain. In that context, we request the Board to ask for additional necessary 
amendments to support the EIB-CM’s legitimacy. These changes will underpin the EIB Group’s 
commitment to and reputation for sustainability and accountability. 

1. The EIB Group Boards must have a more substantive role to support accountability and 
remedy.

We welcome the ways that the new Policy establishes the EIB Group Boards as guardians of the EIB
CM’s independence, including by requiring that they be consulted during the selection of the Head of the 
EIB-CM, and that they ensure that adequate resources and budget to the mechanism so that it may work 
effectively and pursue its mandate. We also strongly commend improvements that will help the EIB-CM 
facilitate effective remedy. By allowing the EIB-CM to relay concerns about projects not yet approved, 
requiring Complainant views to be factored in the development of SRAPs, and strengthening the EIB
CM’s monitoring mandate, among other things, the proposed policy can help the EIB Group avoid 
potential harm, craft appropriate responses, and ensure follow-up.  

 
Nonetheless, the proposed policy is missing a critical component to ensure trust: a sufficient authorizing 
environment from the Boards of Directors as guarantors of the EIB-CM’s independence. As is true of the 
independent accountability mechanisms of peer institutions, the EIB-CM should be empowered in 
practice by the Boards in exercising its impartiality and independence. We therefore call on the EIB Group 
Boards of Directors to fulfil their statutory role of supervising the Management Committee and discharging 
overall responsibilities to ensure that the Bank is properly run. The EIB-CM policy must allow the Boards 
to receive timely, regular, and substantial information directly from the EIB-CM, to be apprised about 
cases, especially where there has been a disagreement between the EIBG Services and the EIB-CM 
regarding the sufficiency of SRAPs. It is wholly insufficient for the Board to support accountability through 
semi-annual reports only.  

The Boards should be informed when the Management Committee takes steps that differ from or 
contradict the EIB-CM’s recommendations, and the rationale underlying such choices. Deference should 
not be blindly afforded to the Management Committee as to the need for, or the sufficiency of, an SRAP. 
Particularly with respect to high-risk projects, the EIB-CM should be able to escalate objections to the 
Boards as the ultimate arbiters of what’s right for remedy.  

The EIB Group Boards’ involvement in the delivery of accountability and remedy would establish a clear 
and transparent authorisation process fully in line with their competence under the EIB Group governance 
structure. We stress that the Boards of Directors are the ultimate decision-making bodies that authorise 
financing for individual projects, and are responsible for ensuring compliance with the EIB Group’s 
Environmental and Social Policy. It only makes sense that the Boards exercise greater oversight of the 
steps taken to address significant non-compliance identified by the EIB-CM. 

2. The EIB-CM’s advisory function should be embraced by the EIB Group Boards. 

We are also pleased to see that the advisory role of the EIB-CM towards the EIB Group Governing Bodies 
has been strengthened. We urge the Boards to frequently and regularly make use of the Policy provision 
by allowing and encouraging the EIB Group Governing Bodies to ask the EIB-CM for advisory products, 
to facilitate learning.  

3. The “Rules of Conduct” for the EIB-CM should be made explicit.  

The updated policy should retain as an annex, verbatim, the well-articulated "Rules of Conduct" for EIB
CM members presently within the 2018 EIB-CM Procedures. Those already deliberated and negotiated 
rules of conduct are important for assessing whether complaints have been handled appropriately, and 
are therefore critical to identifying potential maladministration.  

4. The EIB-CM should be leveraged to help bring resolution to issues raised in parallel 
proceedings. 

The EIB Group should be willing to leverage the EIB-CM regardless of other ongoing processes if doing 
so might help address and settle matters more efficiently than in other fora. Allowing the EIB-CM to 
receive and process complaints raising issues brought in “pending or ongoing” proceedings is prudent 
because no other fora have the mandate or authority to assess the EIB Group's compliance with its own 
policies and provide institutional insight and learning on environmental and social performance.  If all 
parties are willing to engage, the CM should be equipped to readily facilitate constructive problem-solving 
that supports project and programme sustainability better than litigious or zero-sum processes. We 
therefore recommend striking proposed paragraph 37(e), which restricts consideration of complaints 
concerning issues raised in parallel proceedings.  

5. The updated policy should clarify the flexible application of dispute resolution and 
compliance review functions.  

While case history makes it apparent that the EIB-CM has approached dispute resolution and compliance 
review holistically to respond to problems, policy language should be clarified to help potential 
complainants better understand the practice. We recommend the following simple red-line edit to 
paragraph 42 of the proposed policy:  

"If an Environmental and/or Social Complaint is found admissible, the EIB-CM will perform a screening 
of the Complaint, the purpose of which is for the EIB-CM to determine the most appropriate way 
forward to handle it (Early Resolution, Initial Dispute Resolution Assessment and/or Initial Compliance 
Assessment) taking the Complainant’s preference into account. For this purpose, the EIB-CM will 
engage with the Complainant to explain the EIB-CM’s different functions and options.” 

Conclusion 

We call on the EIBG Boards of Directors, in the context of their competence to approve the EIB-CM 
Policy, to order these further amendments to address the shortcomings of the present draft. We remain 
at your disposal should you wish further explanation.  

Yours sincerely, 

CEE Bankwatch Network 
Accountability Counsel 
Inclusive Development International  
Recourse 
Counter Balance 
Urgewald 
Eurodad 
CONCORD Europe